

Poverty and Governance

247G/347G
Spring 2021

Professor: Beatriz Magaloni
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Class Tuesday and Thursday 2:30 to 4:00
Office Hours: Fridays 12:30 to 2:00

Corruption, absence of rule of law, abuse of power, ineffective government, political instability and violence are leading causes of poverty and its persistence. The course will present a survey of some of the major works on the links between politics and poverty. Corruption and government inefficiency emerge as major impediments to alleviate poverty because poverty relief requires active government involvement in provision of public services such as drinking water, health, sanitation, education, roads, electricity and public safety. Poverty relief also requires solving the problem of violence and establishing conditions for the protection of rights (e.g., the rights to life, safety, property, and dignity). The course aims to provide students with knowledge regarding what works and does not work in the quest to alleviate global poverty, reduce violence and improve government accountability in developing countries.

I. Course Requirements

(1) All students, whether auditing or taking the course for credit, must do the readings. Each week students must read ALL of the *required* readings. Students need to actively participate in class and demonstrate that they have done the readings.

(2) Class discussions will be led by groups of undergraduate and graduate students. Undergraduate students will be in charge of presenting the required readings. Class discussion should aim to 1) present the main themes of the readings; and 2) prepare a common set of questions that run through the readings. Students in charge of leading a class discussion will meet with me as a group on Tuesdays at the time of the class to create a lesson plan and discuss a preliminary presentation that will then be presented to the entire class on Thursdays. My Teaching Assistant Luis Rodríguez (luisrs@stanford.edu) will be in charge of organizing the groups and distributing the readings.

(3) Graduate students must submit a summary of the recommended readings (3 papers or one book) for one week. The assignment is due the Wednesday before that week's seminar. These students will also be expected to present to the entire class on Thursday the main themes discussed in these papers and relate their discussion to the themes covered in the required readings.

(4) At the end of the course, students must submit a 10-page research note. Graduate students will submit a 20-page research paper. You can choose any of the topics covered in the course. My office hours are Fridays between 12:30 and 2 when students may discuss with me their research note or research papers.

II. Students with Disabilities

Students who may need an academic accommodation based on the impact of a disability must initiate the request with the Office of Accessible Education (OAE). Professional staff will evaluate the request with required documentation, recommend reasonable accommodations, and prepare an Accommodation Letter for faculty dated in the current quarter in which the request is being made. Students should contact the OAE (URL: <http://studentaffairs.stanford.edu/oae>) as soon as possible since timely notice is needed to coordinate accommodations.

III. Required Books: I have chosen the following books, which you can find in kindle format or/and in electronic format at the Stanford library:

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. *Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty*. Crown Books, 2012.

Collier, Paul. *Bottom billion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007

Pinker, Steven. *The better angels of our nature: Why violence has declined*. Penguin Group USA, 2012.

Banerjee, Abhijit V., Abhijit Banerjee, and Esther Duflo. *Poor economics: A radical rethinking of the way to fight global poverty*. Public Affairs, 2011.

Fisman, R., & Miguel, E. *Economic Gangsters: corruption, violence, and the poverty of nations*. Princeton University Press, 2010.

Diaz-Cayeros, A., Estevez, F., & Magaloni, B. *The political logic of poverty relief: Electoral strategies and social policy in Mexico* Cambridge University Press, 2016

Habyarimana, J., Humphreys, M., Posner, D. N., & Weinstein, J. M. *Coethnicity: Diversity and the Dilemmas of Collective Action* Cambridge University Press, 2009

Journal articles are all obtainable electronically.

1. Introduction to the class and discussion of the syllabus (March 30)

2. Poverty and political institutions (April 1)

Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. (2012). *Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty*. Crown Business.

Recommended

- Fukuyama, Francis. *The origins of political order: From pre-human times to the French Revolution*. Macmillan, 2011.
- Fukuyama, Francis. *Political order and political decay: From the industrial revolution to the globalization of democracy*. Macmillan, 2014.

3. Historical roots of poverty (April 8)

Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A (2001). "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation." *The American Economic Review*, 91(5), 1369-1401.

Nunn N. "The Long Term Effects of Africa's Slave Trades". *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 2008;123(1):139-176.

Dell, M. (2010). "The persistent effects of Peru's mining mita." *Econometrica*, 78(6), 1863-1903.

Nunn, Nathan, and Leonard Wantchekon. 2011. "The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa." *American Economic Review*, 101(7): 3221-52.

Recommended

- Diamond, Jared M., and Doug Orduinio. *Guns, germs, and steel*. 1997.
- La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A, Vishny R. (1998). Law and finance. *Journal of Political Economy*.
- Engerman, S. L., & Sokoloff, K. L. (2002). "Factor endowments, inequality, and paths of development among new world economics" (No. w9259). *National Bureau of Economic Research*.
- Feyrer, J., & Sacerdote, B. (2009). Colonialism and modern income: islands as natural experiments. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 91(2), 245-262.
- Huillery, Elise. "History matters: The long-term impact of colonial public investments in French West Africa." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* (2009): 176-215.
- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James Robinson (2006) "Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth" in Philippe Aghion and Steven Durlauf eds. *Handbook of Economic Growth*, Amsterdam; North-Holland.
- Nunn, N., & Puga, D. (2012). Ruggedness: The blessing of bad geography in Africa. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 94(1), 20-36.

- Iyer, L., & Banerjee, A. (2005). History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India. *American Economic Review*, 95(3), 1190-1213.
- Acharya, Avidit, Matthew Blackwell, and Maya Sen. *Deep roots*. Princeton University Press, 2020.
- Albouy, D. Y. (2012). The colonial origins of comparative development: an empirical investigation: comment. *The American Economic Review*, 102(6), 3059-3076.
- Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2002). "Reversal of fortune: Geography and institutions in the making of the modern world income distribution." *Quarterly journal of economics*, 1231-1294.
- Acharya, Avidit, Matthew Blackwell, and Maya Sen. "The political legacy of American slavery." *The Journal of Politics* 78, no. 3 (2016): 621-641.

4. The poverty and violence trap (April 15)

Collier, Paul. *Bottom billion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007 (chapters 1 and 2)

Steven Pinker *The Better Angels of our Nature* In Viking Pinguin (2011) (chapters 2-4)

Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. "Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war." *American political science review* 97, no. 01 (2003): 75-

Magaloni, Beatriz, Edgar Franco and Vanessa Melo "Killing in the Slums: Criminal Governance, Social Order and Police Violence in Rio de Janeiro, *American Political Science Review*, 2020

Recommended

- Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (Yale University Press, 2006)
- Robert Bates. Bates, R.H., 2015. *When Things Fell Apart*. Cambridge University Press.
- Miguel, Edward, Shanker Satyanath and Ernest Sergenti (2004), "Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach," *Journal of Political Economy* 112 (4):725-753.
- Bates, Robert H., Avner Greif, and Smita Singh. 2002. "Organizing Violence." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 46(5): 599-628
- Fearon, James D. "Primary commodity exports and civil war." *Journal of conflict Resolution* 49, no. 4 (2005): 483-507.
- Elliot Currie *A Peculiar Indifference: The Neglected Toll of Violence on Black America*

- Chris Hayes (2017) *A Colony in a Nation*
- Soss Joe and Vesla Weaver. 2017. Police are Our Government: Politics, Political Science, and the Policing of Raceclass Subjugated Communities." *Annual Review of Political Science*. 20.
- Magaloni, Beatriz and Luis Rodriguez. 2021. Institutionalized Police Brutality: Torture, the Militarization of Security and the Reform of Inquisitorial Criminal Justice in Mexico. *American Political Science Review Volume 114 Issue*
- Yanilda Gonzalez 2020. *Authoritarian Police in Democracy: Contested Security in Latin America*. Cambridge University Press
- Vanessa Barker. 2010. "Explaining the Great American Crime Decline: A Review of Blumstein and Wallman, Goldberger and Rosenfeld, and Zimring" *Law and Social Inquiry Vol. 35, Issue 2 pages 489-516*.
- Lessing, Benjamin. "Logics of violence in criminal war." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59, no. 8 (2015): 1486-1516.
- Calderón, Gabriela, Gustavo Robles, Alberto Díaz-Cayeros, and Beatriz Magaloni. "The beheading of criminal organizations and the dynamics of violence in Mexico." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59, no. 8 (2015): 1455-1485.
- Dell, M. (2015) "Trafficking Networks and the Mexican Drug War." *American Economic Review*.
- Dube, O., & Vargas, J. F. (2013). Commodity price shocks and civil conflict: Evidence from Colombia. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 80(4), 1384-1421.

5. How to Fight Poverty (April 22)

Banerjee, A. V., & Duflo, E. (2011). *Poor economics: A radical rethinking of the way to fight global poverty*. New York: Public Affairs.

Recommended:

- Deaton, Angus. *The great escape: health, wealth, and the origins of inequality*. Princeton University Press, 2013.
- Deaton, Angus, and Nancy Cartwright. "Understanding and misunderstanding randomized controlled trials." *Social Science & Medicine* 210 (2018): 2-21.
- Deaton, Angus. "Instruments, randomization, and learning about development." *Journal of economic literature* 48, no. 2 (2010): 424-55.
- Banerjee, Abhijit, Angus Deaton, and Esther Duflo. "Wealth, health, and health services in rural Rajasthan." *American Economic Review* 94, no. 2 (2004): 326-330.
- Banerjee, A., & Duflo, E. (2009). Udaipur Case Study: "Improving Health Care Delivery in India"
- Duflo, Esther, Rema Hanna, and Stephen P. Ryan. "Incentives work: Getting teachers to come to school." *American Economic Review* 102, no. 4 (2012): 1241-78.
- Banerjee, Abhijit, and Esther Duflo. "Addressing absence." *Journal of Economic perspectives* 20, no. 1 (2006): 117-132.

- Banerjee, Abhijit V., and Esther Duflo. "The experimental approach to development economics." *Annu. Rev. Econ.* 1, no. 1 (2009): 151-178.
- Deaton, Angus S. *Instruments of development: Randomization in the tropics, and the search for the elusive keys to economic development*. No. w14690. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009.

6. Corruption (April 29)

Ray Fisman and Edward Miguel *Economic Gangsters: Corruption, Violence, and the Poverty of Nations*.

Recommended

- Olken, B. A., & Pande, R. (2012) "Corruption in developing countries" *Annual Review of Economics*, 4(1), 479-509.
- Olken, B. A. (2007). "Monitoring corruption: evidence from a field experiment in Indonesia". *Journal of political Economy*, 115(2), 200-249.
- Chong, Alberto, Ana L. De La O, Dean Karlan, and Leonard Wantchekon. "Does corruption information inspire the fight or quash the hope? A field experiment in Mexico on voter turnout, choice, and party identification." *The Journal of Politics* 77, no. 1 (2014): 55-71.
- Olken, Benjamin and Barron, Patrick (2009), "The Simple Economics of Extortion: Evidence from Trucking in Aceh", *Journal of Political Economy* 117(3), 417-452.
- Fisman, Ray and Miriam Golden. 2017. *Corruption: What Everybody Needs to Know* Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Fisman, Ray (2001) "Estimating the Value of Political Connections," *American Economic Review*, 91: 1095-1102.
- Gulzar, Saad, and Benjamin J. Pasquale. "Politicians, bureaucrats, and development: Evidence from India." *American Political Science Review* 111, no. 1 (2017): 162-183.
- Dal Bó, Ernesto, Frederico Finan, and Martín A. Rossi. "Strengthening state capabilities: The role of financial incentives in the call to public service." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 128, no. 3 (2013): 1169-1218.
- Faccio, Mara. "Differences between politically connected and nonconnected firms: A cross-country analysis." *Financial management* 39, no. 3 (2010): 905-928.
- Fisman, R. and Miguel, E. (2007). Corruption, norms, and legal enforcement: Evidence from diplomatic parking tickets. *Journal of Political Economy*, 115(6):102
- Bicchieri, C. and Xiao, E. (2009). Do the right thing: But only if others do so. *Journal of Behavioral Decision Making*, 22(2):191
- Kuziemko, Ilyana y Eric D. Werker (2006), "How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations", *Journal of Political Economy* 114, no. 5 (October 2006): 905-930

- Reinikka, Ritva and Svennson, Jacob (2004) "Local Capture: Evidence from a Central Government Transfer Program in Uganda," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119: 679-705.
- Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2008). Exposing corrupt politicians: the effects of Brazil's publicly released audits on electoral outcomes. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(2), 703-745.
- Callen, Michael, Saad Gulzar, Syed Ali Hasanain, and Muhammad Yasir Khan. *The political economy of public sector absence: experimental evidence from Pakistan*. No. w22340. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2016.
- Gottlieb, J. (2016). Greater Expectations: A Field Experiment to Improve Accountability in Mali. *American Journal of Political Science*, 60(1), 143-157.
- Duflo, Esther, Hanna, Rema, and Stephen Ryan (2007). "Incentives Work: Getting Teachers to Come to School" *American Economic Review*
- Ferraz, Claudio and Frederico Finan (2008), "Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits and Electoral Outcomes," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 703-745.
- Fujiwara, T., & Wantchekon, L. (2013). Can informed public deliberation overcome clientelism? Experimental evidence from Benin. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 5(4), 241-55.

7. Social policies and poverty relief (May 6)

Diaz-Cayeros, A., Estevez, F., & Magaloni, B. (2016). *The political logic of poverty relief: Electoral strategies and social policy in Mexico*. Cambridge University Press.

Recommended

- Stokes, Susan C., Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco. *Brokers, voters, and clientelism: The puzzle of distributive politics*. Cambridge University Press, 2013.
- Ang, Yuen Yuen. *How China escaped the poverty trap*. Cornell University Press, 2016.
- Wantchekon, Leonard. "Clientelism and voting behavior: Evidence from a field experiment in Benin." *World politics* (2003): 399-422.
- Finan, Frederico, and Laura Schechter. "Vote-buying and reciprocity." *Econometrica* 80, no. 2 (2012): 863-881.
- Alatas, V., Banerjee, A., Hanna, R., Olken, B. A., & Tobias, J. (2012). Targeting the poor: evidence from a field experiment in Indonesia. *The American economic review*, 102(4), 1206-1240.
- Bó, E. dal, Frederico Finan, Nicholas Y. Li, and Laura Schechter. "Government decentralization under changing state capacity: experimental evidence from Paraguay." Working Paper Series-National Bureau of Economic Research (Massachusetts) w24879 (2018).
- Hidalgo, F. Daniel, and Simeon Nichter. "Voter buying: Shaping the electorate through clientelism." *American Journal of Political Science* 60, no. 2 (2016): 436-455.

- Handa, S., Seidenfeld, D., Davis, B., & Tembo, G. (2015). "The Social and Productive Impacts of Zambia's Child Grant". *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*.
- De La, O. and Ana, L., 2013. "Do conditional cash transfers affect electoral behavior? Evidence from a randomized experiment in Mexico". *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(1), pp.1-14.
- Cesar Zucco. 2013. "When Payouts Pay Off: Conditional Cash-Transfers and Voting Behavior in Brazil: 2002-2010"
- Fried, B. J. (2012). "Distributive politics and conditional cash transfers: The case of Brazil's Bolsa Familia". *World Development*, 40(5):1042-53
- Fujiwara, Thomas, and Leonard Wantchekon. "Can informed public deliberation overcome clientelism? Experimental evidence from Benin." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 5, no. 4 (2013): 241-55.

8. Ethnic Diversity and Public Goods (May 13)

Habyarimana, J., Humphreys, M., Posner, D. N., & Weinstein, J. M. (2009). *Coethnicity: Diversity and the Dilemmas of Collective Action* Cambridge University Press

Recommended:

- Elinor Ostrom, *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge University Press, 1991
- James Fearon and David Laitin "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," *American Political Science Review*, 90.4 (December 1996), pp. 715-735.
- Habyarimana, J., Humphreys, M., Posner, D. N., & Weinstein, J. M. (2007) Why does ethnic diversity undermine public goods provision? *American Political Science Review*, 101(04), 709-725
- Saumitra Jha "Trade, Institutions, and Ethnic Tolerance: Evidence from South Asia," *American Political Science Review* 107.4 (November 2013), pp. 806-832.
- Kramon, Eric. "Ethnic group institutions and electoral clientelism." *Party Politics* 25, no. 3 (2019): 435-447.
- Kate Baldwin and John Huber (2010) "Economic versus Cultural Differences: Forms of Ethnic Diversity and Public Goods Provision" *American Political Science Review* Vol 104. No. 4.
- Min, B. (2015). *Power and the Vote: Elections and Electricity in the Developing World*. Cambridge University Press, New York
- Bardhan, P. and Mookherjee, D. (2006). Pro-Poor Targeting and Accountability of Local Governments in West Bengal. *Journal of Development Economics*, 79(2):303-327.
- Banerjee, A., & Somanathan, R. (2007). The political economy of public goods: Some evidence from India. *Journal of development Economics*, 82(2), 287-314.
- Jack, B. K., & Recalde, M. P. (2015). Leadership and the voluntary provision of public goods: Field evidence from Bolivia. *Journal of Public Economics*, 122, 80-93.

- Algan Y., C Hémet and D, Laitin (2012) "Diversity and Local Public Goods: A Natural Experiment with Exogenous Residential Allocation"
- Easterly, W., Alesina, A. F., & Baqir, R. (1997). Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 114(4):1243---84.
- Franck, R. and Rainer, I. (2012). Does the leader's ethnicity matter? Ethnic favoritism, education, and health in Sub-Saharan Africa. *American Political Science Review*, 106(2):294-325.
- Kramon, E. and Posner, D. N. (2013). "Who benefits from distributive politics? How the outcome one studies affects the answer one gets". *Perspectives on Politics*, 11(2):461-74
- Lieberman, E. S. and McClendon, G. H. (2013). "The ethnicity policy preference link in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Comparative Political Studies*, 46(5):574:602.
- Kramon, Eric, and Daniel N. Posner. "Ethnic favoritism in education in Kenya." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 11, no. 1 (2016): 1-58.
- Ejdemyr, Simon, Eric Kramon, and Amanda Lea Robinson. "Segregation, ethnic favoritism, and the strategic targeting of local public goods." *Comparative Political Studies* 51, no. 9 (2018): 1111-1143.
- Adida, Claire, Jessica Gottlieb, Eric Kramon, and Gwyneth McClendon. "Breaking the clientelistic voting equilibrium: The joint importance of salience and coordination." *Comparative Political Studies* (2017).

9. Women in power and development (May 20)

Chattopadhyay, Raghavendra, and Esther Duflo. "Women as policy makers: Evidence from a randomized policy experiment in India." *Econometrica* 72, no. 5 (2004): 1409-1443.

Brulé, Rachel, and Nikhar Gaikwad. "Culture, capital and the political economy gender gap: Evidence from Meghalaya's matrilineal tribes." (2017).

Bhavnani, Rikhil R. "Do electoral quotas work after they are withdrawn? Evidence from a natural experiment in India." *American Political Science Review* (2009): 23-35.

Pande, Rohini. "Can mandated political representation increase policy influence for disadvantaged minorities? Theory and evidence from India." *American Economic Review* 93, no. 4 (2003): 1132-1151.

Recommended:

- Duflo, Esther. "Women empowerment and economic development." *Journal of Economic literature* 50, no. 4 (2012): 1051-79.
- Bhavnani, Rikhil R., and Alexander Lee. "Does affirmative action worsen bureaucratic performance? evidence from the indian administrative service."

American Journal of Political Science 65, no. 1 (2021): 5-20.

- Bhavnani, Rikhil R. "Do the effects of temporary ethnic group quotas persist? Evidence from India." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 9, no. 3 (2017): 105-23.
- Brulé, Rachel E. *Women, Power, and Property: The Paradox of Gender Equality Laws in India*. Cambridge University Press, 2020.
- Bhalotra, Sonia, Rachel Brulé, and Sanchari Roy. "Women's inheritance rights reform and the preference for sons in India." *Journal of Development Economics* (2018): 102275.
- Brulé, Rachel E. "Reform, Representation, and Resistance: The Politics of Property Rights' Enforcement." *The Journal of Politics* 82, no. 4 (2020): 1390-1405.
- Prillaman, Soledad. Strength in numbers: How women's groups close India's political gender gap. Working paper, 2017.
- Corsi, Marcella, and Marina De Angelis. "Gender discrimination in microfinance? Some evidence from Uganda." *The Journal of Development Studies* 53, no. 5 (2017): 723-740.
- Sen, Amartya. "More than 100 million women are missing." *Gender and rights* (2017): 81-84.
- Klasen, Stephan, and Claudia Wink. "' Missing women': Revisiting the debate." *Feminist Economics* 9, no. 2-3 (2003): 263-299.
- Bongaarts, John, and Christophe Guilmoto. "How many more missing women?." *The Lancet* 386, no. 9992 (2015): 427.
- Dunning, T. and Nilekani, J. (2013). "Ethnic quotas and political mobilization: Caste, parties, and distribution in Indian village councils". *American Political Science Review*, 107(1):35-56

10. Democracy, health and education (May 27)

Kudamatsu, M. (2012). Has democratization reduced infant mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa? Evidence from micro data. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 10(6):1294-1317

Harding, R., & Stasavage, D. (2013). What democracy does (and doesn't do) for basic services: School fees, school inputs, and African elections. *The Journal of Politics*, 76(1), 229-245.

Miller, G. (2008). Women's suffrage, political responsiveness, and child survival in American history. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(3), 1287-1327.

Recommended

- Paglayan, Agustina S. "The non-democratic roots of mass education: evidence from 200 years." *American Political Science Review* (2020): 1-20.

- Ross, M. (2006). Is democracy good for the poor? *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(4):860-74.
- Callen, Michael, Saad Gulzar, Ali Hasanain, Yasir Khan, and Arman Rezaee. *Personalities and public sector performance: Evidence from a health experiment in Pakistan*. No. w21180. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2015
- Baum, M. A., & Lake, D. A. (2003). The political economy of growth: Democracy and human capital. *American Journal of Political Science*, 47(2), 333-347.
- Sachikonye, L. M. (2002). Democracy, Sustainable Development and Poverty: Are They compatible? Development Policy Management Forum. Democracy, health and education
- Breierova, Lucia, and Esther Duflo. The impact of education on fertility and child mortality: Do fathers really matter less than mothers?. No. w10513. National bureau of economic research, 2004.
- Duflo, Esther. "Child health and household resources in South Africa: evidence from the old age pension program." *American Economic Review* 90, no. 2 (2000): 393-398.
- Banerjee, Abhijit, Angus Deaton, and Esther Duflo. "Wealth, health, and health services in rural Rajasthan." *American Economic Review* 94, no. 2 (2004): 326-330.

11. Traditional governance (June 3)

Baldwin, Kate, and Katharina Holzinger. "Traditional political institutions and democracy: Reassessing their compatibility and accountability." *Comparative Political Studies* 52, no. 12 (2019): 1747-1774.

Magaloni, Beatriz, Alberto Díaz-Cayeros, and Alexander Ruiz Euler. "Public good provision and traditional governance in indigenous communities in Oaxaca, Mexico." *Comparative Political Studies* 52, no. 12 (2019): 1841-1880.

Baldwin, Kate. "Elected MPs, traditional chiefs, and local public goods: Evidence on the role of leaders in co-production from rural Zambia." *Comparative Political Studies* 52, no. 12 (2019): 1925-1956.

Goist, Mitchell, and Florian G. Kern. "Traditional institutions and social cooperation: Experimental evidence from the Buganda Kingdom." *Research & Politics* 5, no. 1 (2018): 2053168017753925.

Recommended

- Baldwin, Kate. *The paradox of traditional chiefs in democratic Africa*. Cambridge University Press, 2016.

- Migdal, Joel S. *Strong societies and weak states: state-society relations and state capabilities in the Third World*. Princeton University Press, 1988.
- Migdal, Joel S. *State in society: Studying how states and societies transform and constitute one another*. Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Magaloni, Beatriz, Kristof Gosztolni and Sarah Thompson "State-evading Solutions to Violence: Organized Crime and Governance in Indigenous Mexico" Unpublished Manuscript
- Ananth Pur, Kripa, and Mick Moore. "Ambiguous institutions: Traditional governance and local democracy in rural south India." *The Journal of Development Studies* 46, no. 4 (2010): 603-623.